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Since the police shooting of Michael Brown in 2014 and the civil unrest that
followed, numerous lawsuits have challenged laws that use the government’s ability to
impose fines and fees for reasons other than the protection of the public. These challenges
have usually raised equal protection challenges to these laws—that is, that the laws
punish the poor more harshly than others. The challenges have been unsuccessful,
largely because courts examine these laws using “rational basis review,” a standard that
is highly deferential to the government and one in which the courts themselves are often
required to actively advocate for the government’s position. This article explains these
challenges, outlines the critiques of rational basis review, and argues that courts should
abandon the use of this standard in cases in which punitive sanctions fall more heavily
on the poor than others.
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The shooting of Michael Brown by an officer of the Ferguson, Mis-
souri, police force in 2014, and the Department of Justice’s subsequent
∗ Managing Attorney, Institute for Justice, Washington Office.
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report on Ferguson’s police department1 brought attention to a harmful
and widespread, but largely ignored, problem in the United States: the
use of the government’s criminal and civil enforcement powers not to
protect the public, but to raise revenue. In Ferguson and countless oth-
er jurisdictions, maximizing financial penalties, sometimes called “po-
licing for profit,” has led to the criminalization of mundane conditions,
heavy-handed law enforcement, biased policing, and courts operating
to quickly convict and obtain fines from defendants who are often fi-
nancially incapable of satisfying the fines and fees imposed by the gov-
ernment.
In the wake of the civil unrest in Ferguson and the Department of
Justice’s report, those affected by these fines and fees regimes began fil-
ing lawsuits challenging revenue-based law enforcement. Many of
these challenges claimed that policing for profit violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause by imposing harsher penalties on those unable to pay
fines and fees than on those who could pay, simply because of their im-
poverishment—that is, the government was discriminating against
them because of their poverty. The suits argued that imposing mone-
tary obligations on those who could not pay, and then punishing them
for being unable to do what they literally could not do, was irrational
and discriminatory.
These arguments are correct. Unfortunately, they have also been
largely unsuccessful. This is because courts have analyzed the constitu-
tionality of such schemes using a deferential mode of judicial review
typically associated with review of economic regulation: the Rational
Basis Test. Under this test, a court will uphold a law if it is “rationally
related to some legitimate government interest.”2 Although, as dis-
cussed below, the level of deference courts will apply in a rational basis
case varies, this test is always highly biased in favor of the government
and extraordinarily difficult for challengers to overcome. Courts using
the Rational Basis Test when considering fines and fees regimes have
thus upheld irrational and discriminatory criminal and civil enforce-
ment systems. These systems trap defendants in poverty, distort polic-
ing goals, erode the impartiality of the courts, and promote distrust be-
tween the police and the communities they purport to serve. Moreover,
they fail to achieve the government’s stated goals and they ultimately
make society less safe.
1. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson
_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P59A-WWDQ].
2. See Jones v. Governor of Florida, 975 F.3d 1016, 1034 (11th Cir. 2020) (“A classification sur-
vives rational basis review if it is rationally related to some legitimate government interest . . . .”
(citing Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993))).
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The first Part of this Article outlines the Rational Basis Test and
how the courts apply it and examines some of the many critiques of the
method. The second Part examines a series of cases that applied a far
more searching scrutiny to government actions that discriminated
against individuals simply because of their poverty. The third Part ex-
amines how courts have applied the Rational Basis Test in fines and fees
cases post-Ferguson. The fourth Part discusses a number of irrational
and discriminatory criminal and civil enforcement policies. The fourth
Part then argues that if and when the courts examine the constitution-
ality of these policies, they should consider their constitutionality on a
full evidentiary record, determine whether the laws at issue comply
with logic and reality, and examine whether they actually deprive peo-
ple of the equal protection of the law. If they do, the courts should not
hesitate to strike them down. This Article concludes by calling on the
courts to do away with the Rational Basis Test in all circumstances and
instead engage in real judging that treats the governed and the gov-
ernment equally, relies on evidence and proof, and protects the consti-
tutional rights of all Americans, regardless of how rich or poor they are.
Short of that, the courts should examine policing for profit to deter-
mine whether fining people who cannot pay for purposes of raising rev-
enue is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and rec-
ognize that it is not.
I. THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST
A. What the Courts Say It Is
It is telling that a method of judicial review that leaves so much
government activity free from constitutional restraints derives not
from a meaningful source like centuries-old Anglo-American common
law, The Federalist Papers, an opinion by John Marshall, commentary by
William Blackstone, or even the U.S. Constitution itself. Instead, the
Rational Basis Test derives from a short, opaque, sparsely referenced
(for its main point) footnote in an otherwise “unremarkable”3 case about
milk. In footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,4 Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone, writing for a unanimous Court, created tiers of
constitutional judicial scrutiny. In one tier, laws that affect some rights
(like those specifically mentioned in the U.S. Constitution) or that dis-
criminate against “discrete and insular minorities,” (sometimes re-
ferred to as a “suspect class”) receive meaningful review (usually called
3. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982).
4. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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“strict scrutiny”). Meanwhile laws affecting everything else are pre-
sumed to be constitutional and receive minimal scrutiny.5 This lower-
level of scrutiny came to be known as the Rational Basis Test.
Over the decades, the U.S. Supreme Court developed a more thor-
ough elucidation of this test. Now, at least on paper, the modern federal
Rational Basis Test has the following components, as set out by the Su-
preme Court in 1993: 6
[R]ational-basis review in equal protection analysis is not a li-
cense for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legis-
lative choices. Nor does it authorize the judiciary to sit as a su-
perlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative
policy determinations made in areas that neither affect funda-
mental rights nor proceed along suspect lines. For these rea-
sons, a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor
proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presump-
tion of validity. Such a classification cannot run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship be-
tween the disparity of treatment and some legitimate govern-
mental purpose. Further, a legislature that creates these cate-
gories need not actually articulate at any time the purpose or
rationale supporting its classification. Instead, a classification
must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is
any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.
A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to
sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. A legislative
choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based
on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data. A statute is presumed constitutional . . . and the burden is
on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it, . . . whether or
not the basis has a foundation in the record. Finally, courts are
compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature’s
generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between
means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis re-
view because it is not made with mathematical nicety or be-
5. Id.
6. State courts sometimes apply more stringent tests under state equivalents of the Equal
Protection Clause while confusingly labeling this test the “Rational Basis Test.” See Robert F. Wil-
liams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 187 (1983) (discussing state court
approaches to the rational basis test).
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cause in practice it results in some inequality. The problems of
government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not
require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and un-
scientific.7
Any “conceivable state of facts,”8 means, by definition, not necessarily
relevant facts or even the truth. Under the Rational Basis Test, the gov-
ernment may justify its policies with false assertions or not justify them
at all. And even if the court knows the government’s justification is
false, the standard requires the court to close its eyes and accept fiction
as the truth. This is precisely what the Supreme Court did in one of the
seminal Rational Basis Test cases, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc., where Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, deliberately closed
his eyes to a statute’s nakedly anticompetitive purpose and imagined
several post hoc, fictitious safety rationales to support the law.9
Unfortunately for those whom the government has discriminated
against and treated more harshly because of their poverty, indigency is
not a suspect class, and laws that treat people differently based on their
wealth (or the lack thereof) are subject to the Rational Basis Test.10
B. What It Actually Is
As my colleague Dana Berliner has noted, the Rational Basis Test
that the courts expound is not always the version that they apply.11 This
is not surprising. Taken literally, almost every suit challenging a law
under the Rational Basis Test, as articulated above, would not survive a
motion to dismiss, regardless of how irrational, harmful, useless, or
7. Heller, 509 U.S. at 319–21 (quotation marks, ellipses, brackets, and citations omitted).
8. See id. at 320.
9. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486, 490 (1955). The statute in
that case forbade opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from an oph-
thalmologist or optometrist, essentially making it impossible for a consumer to obtain new frames
or get a lens, whether it be a new lens or one to duplicate a lost or broken lens, without a prescrip-
tion. Id. at 486. The consumer did not need a new prescription, however. They just needed a new
lens. The statute thus increased the cost of medical care for consumers, inserted ophthalmologists
and optometrists into a transaction in which they were not needed, and did much to reduce or
even eliminate low-cost competition to ophthalmologists and optometrists. Nonetheless, the
Court simply invented several far-fetched rationales of varying degrees of believability to uphold
the law. See id. at 487–88.
10. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (“[T]his Court has nev-
er heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict
scrutiny . . . .”).
11. See Dana Berliner, The Federal Rational Basis Test—Fact and Fiction, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
373, 378–82 (2016) (describing how courts sometimes deviate from the traditional articulation of
the Rational Basis Test while purporting to follow it).
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counterproductive the law at issue is. On paper, the modern test ap-
pears to simply ask whether the legislature was out of its collective
mind when it passed a law; if it was not, the courts will uphold the law
at issue. In other words, if the Rational Basis Test were as deferential to
the government as the Supreme Court has said that it is, the govern-
ment’s power would be limited only by the ability of one of its lawyers or
a judge to imagine a non-insane connection—regardless of how ab-
surd—between what the government says is its goal and the means it
has chosen to achieve it. That would not be deferential judicial review.
It would be no review at all.
Plaintiffs, however, have won more than twenty rational basis cases
before the Supreme Court since 1970, so there is more to rational basis
review than the Supreme Court’s articulation of the test would sug-
gest.12 Instead, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts strike down laws under the Rational Basis Test when there is no
logical connection between the law and the government’s purported in-
terest,13 when the law imposes a harm that vastly outweighs any plausi-
ble benefit,14 or when the government is demonstrating animus to a
particular group, even when that group has not been viewed as a “dis-
crete and insular minority.”15
12. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774–75 (2013); id. at 793–94 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the Court relied on rational basis review); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614–15 (2000); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528
U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (per curiam); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 108 (1989); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. Ctny. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 449–50 (1985); Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985); Williams v. Ver-
mont, 472 U.S. 14, 24–25 (1985); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880 (1985); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61–63 (1982); Chappelle v. Greater Baton
Rouge Airport Dist., 431 U.S. 159, 159 (1977) (per curiam); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141–42 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 76–78
(1972); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196–97 (1971); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971);
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 363–64 (1970).
13. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 56–58 (striking down an Alaskan law that distributed oil money to
residents based on the length of their state residency because of the government’s asserted justifi-
cation—encouraging settlement in Alaska—and the means the government chose to accomplish
this goal—paying long-term residents more than recent ones).
14. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 206–07 (striking down a law that denied public education funding to
the children of undocumented immigrants because of the harm to these children, even though the
law accomplished the government’s purported goal of saving money).
15. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (striking down a state statute that demonstrated anti-gay ani-
mus); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449–50 (striking down a city ordinance that restricted a group
home for individuals with developmental disabilities when the city allowed other group homes of
the same size to operate).
SUMMER 2021] Rational Basis Test & Policing for Profit 845
C. Flaws in the Rational Basis Test
The flaws in the Rational Basis Test are obvious and almost innu-
merable. As an initial matter, the test cleaves “fundamental rights” from
“nonfundamental rights” without ever describing clearly what makes a
right fundamental or nonfundamental, except that the rights listed in
the Bill of Rights and those rights “traditionally protected by our socie-
ty” and “rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people,”16—
whatever that means—are fundamental. Everything else is not. The list
of rights deemed “fundamental” by the Court includes the specific liber-
ties listed in the Bill of Rights, in addition to the rights to marry, to have
children and direct their education and upbringing, to use contracep-
tion, to engage in intimate relations, and to obtain an abortion.17 Be-
yond these rights and others like them, whether something is “funda-
mental” is anyone’s guess.
Of course, the real reason a court thinks a right is fundamental is
simply that a federal or state judge believes it is important. Judicial de-
cisions about what is important enough to warrant constitutional pro-
tection often coincide with what the well-educated, affluent men and
women who make up the federal and state judiciaries find is important
to them. For such people, the harm that befalls a person when they lose
their driver’s license or are barred from their chosen profession is simp-
ly not something with which they have much experience. This discon-
nect becomes more pronounced if we are talking about people far out-
side of the judges’ environment, like unhoused populations,
undocumented immigrants, or people who have lived their entire lives
viewing the police with suspicion.
The Rational Basis Test also requires the court to abandon its role as
a neutral adjudicator making decisions based on admissible evidence in
an adversarial contest between two parties. Instead, “judges in rational
basis cases are instructed to place a heavy judicial thumb on the gov-
ernment’s side of the scales in the form of an essentially irrebuttable
presumption that the government is pursuing constitutionally permis-
sible ends, regardless of whether it actually is.”18 Thus, unique among
all other forms of litigation in the United States, the Rational Basis Test
encourages one party to pervert the truth (or at least engage in an
alarming lack of candor) in presenting its case to a court.19 And if the
government is unable or unwilling to make up a reason, the test re-
16. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122–23 (1989) (citation omitted).
17. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
18. Clark Neily, Litigation Without Adjudication: Why the Modern Rational Basis Test Is Unconstitu-
tional, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 537, 543 (2016).
19. Id.
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quires the court to do it for them.20 This is not the judiciary acting as an
umpire calling “balls and strikes”21—this is the umpire taking away one
team’s mitts, picking up a foul ball, throwing it over the left field fence,
and calling it a home run.
Related to this problem is the fact that a strict reading of the Ra-
tional Basis Test either forbids or at least strongly discourages the de-
velopment of an evidentiary record.22 This approach applies even
though the challenger is required to negate every conceivable basis for
the law to succeed. The challenger is left with nothing with which to ne-
gate the government’s assertions. In other words, in the harshest form
of the test, one party is forbidden from putting on a case, and the ques-
tion of whether something is true or false becomes extraneous. What
the government—a party, one should recall, which is encouraged by the
case law to simply make stuff up if it is convenient—says is determina-
tive.23 Why should a court act as a factfinder when the truth is irrele-
vant?
One could go on. It is enough to say at this point, however, that the
application of the Rational Basis Test almost always results, not in a
search for truth, but in a biased simulacrum of a judicial proceeding.24
Its inherent unfairness means that such a case is a challenge for any
plaintiff. It is especially a challenge for the impoverished targets of po-
licing for profit, who are often incarcerated and usually cannot afford
the sophisticated, experienced counsel necessary to have even a chance
at prevailing in a Rational Basis Test. If not for the existence of public
interest law firms, these defendants would never have the chance to
bring, much less win, a case challenging a fines and fees regime under
the Rational Basis Test.
20. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (“[I]t is entirely irrelevant for
constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually moti-
vated the legislature.”); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (specu-
lating on what might have motivated the Oklahoma legislature to pass the law at issue).
21. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Rob-
erts, Jr.).
22. See Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (1993) (“[A] legislative choice is not subject to court-
room fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data.” (citation omitted)).
23. See Neily, supra note 18, at 552 (discussing cases and how the Rational Basis Test encour-
ages the government to dissemble and misrepresent the government’s true reason for legislation).
24. But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and Desirable), 14 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401 (2016). Even such a strong proponent of the test as Professor Chemerinsky
finds the test as articulated too deferential to the government, however. See id. at 403. “A rational
basis can never justify government deprivation of life, but it can justify the taking of liberty or
property. But a merely conceivable purpose should be insufficient to do so. There should have to be
an actual legitimate purpose, and there should be a meaningful relationship between the means
chosen and the ends sought to be achieved.” Id.
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II. THE GRIFFIN/BEARDEN LINE OF CASES
Those challenging the constitutionality of fines and fees regimes
believed, with some justification, that cases revolving around a chal-
lenger’s indigency would not be subject to the Rational Basis Test. This
was because, in a series of cases stretching from Griffin v. Illinois25 in
1956 to M.L.B. v. S.L.J.26 in 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when
the justice system treats the indigent more harshly solely because they
are poor, due process and equal protection converge in ways that defy
the rote application of the Court’s traditional tiers of judicial scrutiny.27
Specifically, in Bearden v. Georgia,28 a case concerning whether the state
could revoke probation for someone too poor to pay his legal financial
obligations, the Court set out a more searching approach for laws that
implemented economic disparities in the justice system. Under the
Bearden approach, the Court examines (1) the nature of the individual
interest affected, (2) the extent to which it is affected, (3) the rationality
of the connection between the legislative means and purpose, and (4)
any alternative means to effectuate this purpose.29 The Court held that
in making this decision, due process and equal protection considera-
tions converged and that, when a person who is indigent has made all
reasonable efforts to pay outstanding fines or restitution, it is “funda-
mentally unfair” to punish them without considering whether any al-
ternatives exist.30
While the Bearden line of cases does provide a more searching in-
quiry into the government’s justifications and evidence than the Ra-
tional Basis Test, it also contains caveats that severely limit its applica-
bility. Foremost is the fact that the decisions do not prohibit the
government from engaging in unfair wealth discrimination; they forbid
the government from engaging in “fundamentally unfair” wealth dis-
crimination.31 Thus, the government may discriminate against people
solely for their wealth, but it cannot do so in a “fundamentally unfair”
way. Put another way, the state can treat a poor person worse  than a
rich person just so long as it does not do it too much. But how much is
too much is anyone’s guess.
25. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
26. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
27. See also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Mayer v.
City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
28. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
29. Id. at 666–67.
30. Id. at 666.
31. Id. at 666 n.7.
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The decisions also emphasize the “character and intensity of the in-
dividual interest at stake.”32 By suggesting that a more searching scru-
tiny would occur only when the interests at stake were extremely high,
the decisions have allowed judges to limit their applicability to those in-
stances that have involved such weighty matters as a person’s individual
liberty, their ability to maintain family bonds, and the capacity to marry
or divorce.33 If these interests are sufficiently important that their dep-
rivation due to indigency would be “fundamentally unfair,” however,
why are these interests not “fundamental rights” subject to strict scruti-
ny under traditional Equal Protection Clause analysis? By limiting the
application of the Bearden line of cases to such weighty matters, the
courts have reduced it to little more than another version of the “fun-
damental rights” requirement for strict scrutiny, all while fashioning a
test that purports to provide greater protections for the indigent but
which results in less judicial scrutiny, not more.
This has led courts examining fines and fees cases post-Ferguson to
avoid applying the more searching scrutiny of Bearden by drawing arti-
ficial distinctions between the interests in the Griffin/Bearden line of
cases and whatever is not as important as the loss of one’s personal lib-
erty or the structure of one’s family. For instance, in Fowler v. Benson, a
case concerning whether Michigan could suspend the licenses of those
unable to pay their court debt because of their poverty, the Sixth Circuit
held that the Griffin/Bearden line of cases did not apply because the in-
terest at issue in that case was a property interest, not a liberty inter-
est.34 Specifically, the court refused to apply the more searching scruti-
ny of the Griffin/Bearden line of cases because “[t]hose cases dealt with
the basic features of the criminal justice system—imprisonment, pro-
bation, and appeals. Property interests are not due the same degree of
legal protection as the fundamental liberty interests implicated in the
Griffin line of cases.”35
Similarly, in Jones v. Governor of Florida, a case concerning whether
the state may condition restoring a felon’s voting rights on the felon’s
payment of all fines, fees, costs, and restitution, the Eleventh Circuit
specifically limited the Griffin/Bearden line of cases to instances where
the government is extending punishment based on poverty.36 The court
32. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120–21 (1996) (“[W]e inspect the character and intensity of
the individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State’s justification for its exaction, on
the other.” (citing Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67)).
33. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113–17 (discussing the series of cases where the Court found the
interests at issue to be sufficiently important to warrant more searching scrutiny).
34. Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 260–61 (6th Cir. 2019).
35. Id. (footnote omitted).
36. Jones v. Governor of Florida, 975 F.3d 1016, 1032 (11th Cir. 2020).
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ultimately held that the Griffin/Bearden cases simply do not apply in cas-
es outside of “the contexts in which they arose.”37
The focus on the importance of the interest at stake has limited the
application of these cases, but making the interest the determinative (or
even the only) factor is incorrect. What ultimately mattered in the Grif-
fin/Bearden line of cases was that the poor were treated more harshly by
the justice system simply because they were poor. While the cases do
evince a concern about the nature of the interest affected by the dis-
crimination, the cases rest on the idea that, in the criminal and civil jus-
tice systems, the poor should not face consequences that the well-off do
not for the sole reason of their indigency. When faced with a Grif-
fin/Bearden claim, courts should recognize that government interfer-
ence with interests other than the ones at issue in those cases can be
“fundamentally unfair.”
In the end, the focus on the interest at stake obscures the more fun-
damental point that the criminal and civil justice system may not, un-
der either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, oper-
ate as a two-tier system, treating the poor and those who are not poor
differently. This is not to suggest that courts should treat poverty as a
suspect class. This is not because those in poverty are not significantly
disadvantaged in modern society. It is instead because courts should
not be in the business of providing some Americans meaningful judicial
analysis and refusing to provide it to others. The Equal Protection
Clause robustly guarantees all Americans equal justice. Everyone
should receive meaningful assessment of their claims. When courts fail
to undertake a substantive examination of claims and allow the gov-
ernment to punish the poor more harshly than the rich, they are accept-
ing an artificial and extraconstitutional classification created to with-
hold real scrutiny of government action.
Nonetheless, in the post-Ferguson cases, the courts have declined
to apply meaningful scrutiny to claims that punish the poor more than
the rich and have instead applied the Rational Basis Test to fines and
fees regimes. The next section analyzes these cases.
III. APPLYING THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST POST-FERGUSON
As of mid-2021, all the cases challenging fines and fees regimes
post-Ferguson have failed the Rational Basis Test.38 Most of these cases
37. Id. at 1033. See also Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1171 (D. Or. 2018) (upholding
Oregon’s driver’s license suspension statute and declining to apply Griffin/Bearden review because
“[w]hat all of these cases teach is that the ‘fundamental fairness’ principles of due process and
equal protection originating in Griffin have been applied when either incarceration or access to the
courts, or both, is at stake.”).
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have arisen in the context of laws requiring or permitting states to re-
scind the driver’s license of those who have not paid their court debt,
while two have involved other types of regimes.
The driver’s licenses cases should have been the most susceptible to
attack. If there was any policy that could be classified as irrational to the
point of being practically insane, it is this one.39 As Justice Sotomayor
has noted, losing one’s vehicle interferes “not only with [one’s] ability to
earn an income and pay their creditors but also with their access to
childcare, groceries, medical appointments, and other necessities.”40
Quite simply, such laws drive people into poverty41 by depriving them of
their ability to get to work and their access to medical care, schooling,
and childcare.42 They disproportionately harm the poor—the very peo-
ple who are least likely to be able to pay their court debt43—and fore-
38. See Robinson v. Long, 814 F. App’x 991 (6th Cir. 2020) (upholding Tennessee’s driver’s li-
cense suspension statute); Jones v. Governor of Florida, 975 F.3d 1016, 1025 (11th Cir. 2020). Fowler
v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2019) (upholding Michigan’s driver’s license suspension statute);
White v. Shwedo, No. 19-3083, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83057 (D.S.C. May 11, 2020) (upholding
South Carolina’s driver’s license suspension statute); Motley v. Taylor, 451 F. Supp. 3d 1251 (M.D.
Ala. 2020) (upholding Alabama’s driver’s license suspension statute); Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F.
Supp. 3d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (upholding North Carolina’s driver’s license revocation statute);
Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (D. Or. 2018) (upholding Oregon’s driver’s license suspen-
sion statute); State v. Doe, 927 N.W.2d 656 (Iowa 2019) (upholding a state statute that created a
right to expungement of criminal records, provided the formerly convicted person paid all their
court-imposed costs and fees).
39. It is difficult to fully express how harmful and counter-productive this approach to col-
lecting court debt is, although some have made heroic efforts to do so. See Resources, FREE TO DRIVE,
https://www.freetodrive.org/resources/#page-content [https://perma.cc/EJG7-NZFG] (last visited
Dec. 6, 2020).
40. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141S. Ct. 585, 593–94 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
41. One study of New Jersey found that “42% of drivers lost their job after their driving privilege
was suspended. Of those drivers, 45% were unable to find new employment. Of those that were able to
find another job, 88% reported a decrease in income.” AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, BEST
PRACTICES GUIDE TO REDUCING SUSPENDED DRIVERS 6 (2013), https://www.aamva.org/WorkArea
/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=3723&libID=3709 [https://perma.cc/V9NR-JTX8].
42. Andrea Marsh, Rethinking Driver’s License Suspensions for Nonpayment of Fines and Fees, in
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., TRENDS IN STATE COURTS: FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES 20, 22 (Deborah W. Smith et al. eds., 2017), https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org
/digital/collection/accessfair/id/787 [https://perma.cc/5ANH-9X76]; SANDRA GUSTITUS, MELODY
SIMMONS & MARGY WALLER, ACCESS TO DRIVING AND LICENSE SUSPENSION POLICIES FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY ECONOMY 4 (2008), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71349179.pdf [https://perma.cc
/TU9F-XYLR].
43. See RYAN T. SCHWIER & AUTUMN JAMES, IND. UNIV. ROBERT H. MCKINNEY SCH. OF L.,
ROADBLOCK TO ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: HOW DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION POLICIES IN INDIANA
IMPEDE SELF-SUFFICIENCY, BURDEN STATE GOVERNMENT & TAX PUBLIC RESOURCES 33 (2016),
https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/practice/clinics/_docs/DL_Rpt_2-1-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HPM-
SRPL] (“For those without regular access to a car, access to jobs, medical care, and leisure are in-
complete, inefficient and inconvenient.”) (quoting CENTRAL IND. TRANSIT TASK FORCE, SUMMARY
REPORT ON TRANSPORTATION ALTERNATIVES IN CENTRAL INDIANA 3 (2010)).
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close a defendant’s ability to access certain lines of work, like construc-
tion, driving a cab or working for a ride-share company, or driving an
ambulance.44 Because of the harsh consequences of not having a li-
cense, many people simply continue to drive after their license has been
suspended or revoked, often times without insurance.45 In some cases,
driving without a license can lead to incarceration in state prison, a
pointless waste for the driver, prison security, the state budget, and
taxpayers.46 This is in addition to the time and resources that the police
must devote to tracking down, arresting, and helping convict people
who often pose no threat to the community.47 And all this harm occurs
without any evidence suggesting that suspending or revoking some-
one’s driver’s license for failure to pay court debt increases the likeli-
hood that they will repay their debt.48
In sum, a law suspending or rescinding drivers’ licenses for failure
to pay court debt makes people poorer, prevents the police from pro-
tecting the public, consumes limited resources, and encourages law-
breaking. Such a law inflicts all this harm in the name of an impossible
objective: to force people to pay a debt they cannot pay. Nonetheless,
courts examining these harmful, irrational, and unproductive laws have
upheld them under the Rational Basis Test.49
In Fowler, which has become the leading case on the issue, the Sixth
Circuit found that Michigan’s law was motivated not by a desire for rev-
enue but by a legitimate goal of incentivizing compliance with traffic
laws and court orders.50 When the plaintiffs pointed out that by ful-
filling this goal, it becomes more difficult for people who owe court
debt to get to work to earn the money to pay off that court debt, the
court rejected that argument by relying on the Rational Basis Test’s ex-
treme deference to legislative judgments, even while recognizing that
the plaintiffs had a point:
Perhaps Plaintiffs are right that the policy is unwise, even coun-
terproductive. But under rational basis review we ask only
whether Michigan’s statutes are rationally related to legitimate
government interests. Michigan’s choice to wield the cudgel of
driver’s-license suspension for nonpayment of court debt dra-
44. See GUSTITUS ET AL., supra note 42, at 9 (“[S]ome employers, particularly in the construc-
tion and health care fields, require a driver’s license as a precondition for employment—either be-
cause driving is part of the job, or as a way to screen applicants.”).
45. See id.
46. See SCHWIER & JAMES, supra note 43, at 25–26.
47. See id. at 35–36.
48. AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 41, at 4.
49. See cases cited supra note 38.
50. Fowler, 924 F.3d at 262.
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matically heightens the incentive to pay. Such a policy is ration-
ally related to the government’s interest in prompt assessment
and collection of civil penalties. That this policy may in many
cases make that—now more highly incentivized—payment
harder to accomplish does not show that the law lacks a rational
basis.51
The federal district courts have followed this reasoning and have upheld
driver’s license laws against similar challenges in every case.52
The federal courts are not the only ones to come to such a conclu-
sion about counterproductive and harmful laws, however. In State v.
Doe, the Iowa Supreme Court considered a state statute that created a
right to expungement of criminal records, provided the formerly con-
victed person paid all their court-imposed costs and fees.53 An indigent
defendant challenged the court-debt requirement, arguing that the
state’s condition discriminated against her because of her poverty.54
Applying the Rational Basis Test (or, more accurately, Iowa’s substan-
tively identical version of the Rational Basis Test), the court found that
Iowa had a legitimate purpose in encouraging payment of court debt.55
Like the Sixth Circuit in Fowler, the Iowa court recognized the plaintiff’s
point while rejecting it under the Rational Basis Test:
Doe offers policy arguments favoring expungement, noting an
arrest record may limit employment opportunities that could
enable defendants to pay off the underlying court debt. An ar-
rest record may also limit available housing, and offenders real-
istically need a place to live in order to land and keep a job.
Steady employment reduces recidivism. Our task, however, is
not to weigh this statute’s effectiveness but its constitutionality.
Doe’s policy arguments should be directed to the legislature.56
Finally, in Jones, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the requirement in
Florida’s Amendment 4 that required ex-felons to pay all of their out-
standing court debt before they could regain the ability to vote.57 The
court held that “[t]he twin interests of disenfranchising those who dis-
regard the law and restoring those who satisfy the demands of justice
51. Id. at 262–63 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
52. See cases cited supra note 38.
53. State v. Doe, 927 N.W.2d 656 (Iowa 2019).
54. Id. at 659.
55. Id. at 665.
56. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
57. Jones v. Governor of Florida, 975 F.3d 1016, 1025 (11th Cir. 2020).
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are both legitimate goals for a State to advance.”58 Applying the ex-
tremely deferential version of the Rational Basis Test, the court deter-
mined that “[t]he people of Florida could rationally conclude that felons
who have completed all terms of their sentences, including paying their
fines, fees, costs, and restitution, are more likely to responsibly exercise
the franchise than those who have not.”59
Doe and the driver’s license cases stretch the Rational Basis Test to
its absolute limit. In each case, the courts disregarded two levels of irra-
tionality: the first being the state’s attempt to get money from people
who simply do not have it, and the second being the state’s effort to in-
centivize repayment by making it more difficult for debtors to earn
money to the pay their debt to the government. If the Rational Basis
Test does not forbid doubly irrational laws like these, then perhaps it
needs a more accurate name, like “The Government Wins Test.” In each
of these cases, judges could have engaged in real fact-finding, including
cross-examination of witnesses, expert testimony, and documentary
proof, that tested whether the governments’ interests were legitimate
or were simply taxation by citation. The courts could have also engaged
in real fact-finding to determine, if the government’s interests were le-
gitimate, whether the means chosen by the government to achieve these
goals actually did so. Instead, in these cases, the courts allowed the gov-
ernment to irrationally discriminate against people for doing some-
thing they literally were unable to do, and then permitted the govern-
ment make it even more difficult for defendants to do what the
government wanted them to do in the first instance.
Jones is somewhat different in two ways. First, there was legitimate
fact-finding in the case, though the majority did not analyze this evi-
dence in its discussion of the Rational Basis Test—a point made by one
of the dissents in that case.60 Second, the law at issue did not make it
more difficult for the plaintiffs to pay their fines and fees.61 The deci-
sion still suffered, however, from the essential error that underlies the
driver’s license cases and Doe: a government policy that discriminates
against the poor for failing to pay an amount they cannot pay is ulti-
mately irrational. Whatever interest the government may have, that in-
terest cannot be accomplished by asking someone to do something that
is impossible.
These cases show how the Rational Basis Test allows the govern-
ment to maintain irrational, counterproductive, harmful, and discrim-
inatory laws that specifically harm the poor without the intervention of
58. Id. at 1034.
59. Id. at 1035.
60. Id. at 1066–74 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (discussing the evidence adduced at trial).
61. Id. at 1032.
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the courts. This kind of purposeless distinction between people should
be exactly what the Equal Protection Clause prevents. In modern Amer-
ican courts, however, the explicit constitutional protections of the
Equal Protection Clause must take a back seat to an overly deferential
test arising from a footnote.
IV. GOING FORWARD
These cases are not the end of the story. Unfortunately, there exists
a panoply of irrational laws affecting indigent defendants across the
country. Such laws include ones that criminalize homelessness—or re-
strict the ability of convicted offenders to house themselves near certain
institutions, thereby making it far more likely that they to end up
homeless—and laws that require towns to tow vehicles for failing to pay
traffic and parking tickets.62 These are in addition to laws that fall heav-
ily on the poor and act as revenue generators, funding government on
the backs of those least able to afford it.
How should courts analyze these cases if and when they come be-
fore them? As for the Supreme Court, it should do away with the Ra-
tional Basis Test in all circumstances as an unfair, biased, unconstitu-
tional distortion of the judicial process.63 Instead, the Court should
extend the basic rules of adjudication to constitutional cases: an em-
phasis on the search for the truth, using evidence, fact-finding, and the
application of neutral rules imposed by a disinterested adjudicator.
The lower courts, who are stuck with the Rational Basis Test until
the Supreme Court finally undoes its almost-century-old error, should
apply the version of the test that Dana Berliner and others have identi-
fied—a rational basis test with bite. This means that the courts should
strike down laws affecting the poor (and everyone else) when there is no
logical connection between the law and the government’s purported in-
terest, when the law imposes a harm that vastly outweighs any plausible
benefit, or when the government is demonstrating animus to a particu-
lar group, even when that group has not been viewed as a “discrete and
insular minority.”
Lower courts could also apply the Griffin/Bearden standards more
broadly to recognize that it would be “fundamentally unfair” for the
government to discriminate in ways that harm fundamental interests
62. See, e.g., Scott Simon, Opinion, Should It Be Illegal to Sleep Outside?, NPR (Dec. 14, 2019, 8:04
AM); Julie Wartell, Residency Restrictions: What’s Geography Got to Do with It?, GEOGRAPHY & PUB.
SAFETY, May 2009, at 1.
63. See Andrew Ward, The Rational-Basis Test Violates Due Process, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 714,
727–35 (2014) (explaining how the Rational Basis Test violates due process, the ABA’s Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, and the United Nations’ Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary).
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such as the ability to earn an honest living, get to work and school, re-
ceive medical care, or not descend into poverty simply because the ju-
risdiction in which they live would like more revenue. Put another way,
the lower courts could recognize that the Griffin/Bearden line of cases are
not limited to only those circumstances in which they arose.
Until these reforms occur, the courts will remain complicit in en-
suring that poor defendants in this country will be subject to laws that
make them poorer, destroy their ability to fully participate in society,
and which contribute heavily to the distrust between the police and the
communities that they purport to serve that sent many to streets of our
cities after the killing of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer in
the summer of 2020.64 This result is not dictated by the Constitution,
and the courts have an obligation to undo it at the first opportunity.
These reforms do not mean that the judiciary will infringe on the
operation of the other branches. This kind of judicial engagement is in-
stead an expression of the wisdom of the separation of powers. The
U.S. Constitution and our judicial heritage do not recognize the judici-
ary as a supine branch, acceding to the executive and legislative
branches in almost all circumstances. The judiciary’s job is to enforce
the Constitution and check the other branches when they go beyond the
borders of that document. Under our constitutional system, judges are
not tasked simply to work in concert with the other branches to infringe
upon individual rights, especially when those rights are possessed by
people who have little else. Without an engaged judiciary, constitution-
al guarantees like equal protection become just words on paper. And as
the above discussion shows, an enervated judiciary can have devastat-
ing consequences for the individual and for society at large.
CONCLUSION
Of course, much of this would be unnecessary if state and local gov-
ernments recognized the constitutional limitations on their actions
without judicial intervention and simply passed fewer laws criminaliz-
ing behavior that does not harm others. As it stands, the Rational Basis
Test gives governments far too much latitude to act beyond their consti-
tutional boundaries. When the courts do not enforce the Constitution,
the result is, among other things, more people in prison, more people in
debt, and more people alienated from society, as the government takes
64. Lisa Shumaker, U.S. Saw Summer of Black Lives Matter Protests Demanding Change, U.S.
NEWS (Dec. 7, 2020, 8:04 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2020-12-07/us-
saw-summer-of-black-lives-matter-protests-demanding-change [https://perma.cc/Z5SV-53JV].
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more power and leaves individuals with less freedom. As Alec Kara-
katsanis has said:
American courts have long required a high constitutional bur-
den in criminal cases: no person can be imprisoned unless the
government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that she is guilty.
This reflects a paramount libertarian concern with agents of the
state doing violence to a person’s body by confining a person to
a cage against her will. But while the legal system thinks of it-
self as applying extreme rigor to decisions about when a person
can be caged, it does not apply any rigor to an antecedent ques-
tion: Is this conduct something for which we should cage a hu-
man being?65
Until governments start asking themselves that question, the courts
should stop acting as willing partners in the impoverishment, incarcer-
ation, and punishment of people simply because they are poor.
65. Alec Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About “Criminal Justice Reform,”
128 YALE L.J. F. 848, 865 (2019) (footnotes omitted).
